Florida State University Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 1

Article 1

2000

The Coevolution of Administrative Law with Everything Else
J.B. Ruhl
jb.ruhl@vanderbilt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
J.B. Ruhl, The Coevolution of Administrative Law with Everything Else, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2000) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol28/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW

THE COEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
WITH EVERYTHING ELSE
J.B. Ruhl

VOLUME 28

FALL 2000

NUMBER 1

Recommended citation: J.B. Ruhl, The Coevolution of Administrative Law with Everything
Else, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).

THE COEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
WITH EVERYTHING ELSE
J.B. RUHL*
I am, first and foremost, an environmental lawyer. I have practiced, taught, and written in the environmental law field for going on
twenty years. That has made me, by necessity, an administrative
procedure specialist as well. One cannot practice environmental law
at any sophisticated level without knowing the ins and outs of administrative agencies and their powers and procedures. Nevertheless, I remain, at best, a mere dabbler in regulatory theory. And I
don’t sense that I am different in that respect from most other veteran environmental lawyers: we know administrative law, but we
don’t often delve into pure regulatory theory. Furthermore, I don’t
believe environmental lawyers are much different in that respect
from the lawyers practicing in other substantive fields touched in
some significant way by administrative law.
Why is that? Why do so many lawyers have this strong connection
to administrative procedure, but a persistent detachment from regulatory theory? In pondering this I divided the world of lawyers into
three types. The first type consists of a small cadre of administrative
law junkies—gurus to the rest of us—who probe all the nooks and
crannies of administrative law and ask the deep theoretical questions
at every opportunity. These “Type I” lawyers are a font of regulatory
theory.
At the other extreme are the “Type III” lawyers, those whose practice simply does not involve agencies, directly or indirectly. They
never have need of administrative law and thus could care less about
regulatory theory. With the growth of the administrative state, this
is a small and shrinking group of lawyers, albeit perhaps a happy lot,
given their infrequent forays into administrative law and bureaucracy.
In the middle fall the rest of us, the “Type II” lawyers. We are
practitioners and academics working in substantive fields that are
directly regulated or indirectly affected by the regulatory process.
Many of these lawyers don’t know they are practicing administrative
law, or don’t want to admit it, but they are. I’m going to retain my
Type II persona and offer an explanation of why we have paid insufficient attention to regulatory theory—and why we should view a
symposium such as this as “a good thing.”
My first observation as a Type II is an obvious point, that administrative law would perish on its own. It needs to attach itself to
other fields of substantive law for it to live and breathe. Whether the
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relationship it has with other fields is one of parasitism or mutualism, the point is that they coevolve. Coevolution involves feedback
loops between the coevolving systems, and these loops can be very
loose, very tight, or somewhere in between.1 We see this all the time
between administrative law and environmental law.
A good example is the bubble rule: The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) came up with the bubble rule in air pollution law; administrative law picked it up as an administrative law issue. Soon
the Chevron rule of deference to administrative interpretations of
legislation was born, and since then environmental law has had to
live with it. 2 Thus, moves that take place in one sphere prompt
moves in the other, and so on back and forth.
The environmental lawyers in this tennis game are aware of the
serves and volleys administrative law delivers, but we don’t get to
see its game book. For one thing, we’re busy—busy working on the
substance and theory of environmental law. We don’t have time to
keep track of the Type I lawyers. And quite frankly, we’re too narrow-minded—mired in substance—to think very broadly about
administrative law theory. The Type I lawyers, the administrative
law junkies, roam the range of substantive fields and are thus in a
better position to connect regulatory theory with regulatory
experience.
But it is a mistake—a mistake I admit committing—for the Type
II lawyers not to try to learn more about administrative law’s game.
When I was in private practice we’d get so excited when a constitutional law issue came along. We’d think theoretically! Administrative
law issues were too garden-variety to evoke those emotions, and
regulatory theory—well, that was even farther from our minds.
That’s the irony: administrative law did more than constitutional law
did to shape our day-to-day practice experience, but we simply took it
for granted. Yet given the importance of regulatory theory to administrative law, and of administrative law to environmental law, there’s
no doubt in my mind today that environmental lawyers could be better environmental lawyers by paying more attention to regulatory
theory.

1. For more on the description of feedback loops and coevolution in law, see J.B.
Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and
Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. R EV . 1407 (1996).
2. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Chevron is a standard principal case in both administrative law and environmental
law casebooks. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 139 (1997) (administrative law); JERRY MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 760
(4th ed. 1998) (same); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 890 (4th ed. 1994)
(same); FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 471 (3d ed. 1999)
(environmental law); ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 390
(5th ed. 1999) (same); ZYGMUNDT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
427 (2d ed. 1998) (same).
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Indeed, to get to the point of this, my introduction of the excellent
principal papers in this symposium, each focuses on some feature of
the coevolution process and offers us Type II lawyers insight into the
regulatory theory in play. First, Professor Steven Croley’s paper on
the role of special interests and public interests in regulation goes to
the core of the interaction between administrative process and environmental law substance.3 From its birth environmental law has
never suffered from a shortage of special interests debating different
visions of the public interest. 4 We’re still far from sorting it out.
Using (not surprisingly) for one of his case studies an example
from environmental law, Professor Croley explores how outcomes are
shaped by the feedback between the administrative process and the
environmental law interests at stake. He makes a compelling case
that administrative process has played a larger role in shaping outcomes than “interest group” theories of regulation suggest. This tells
us much about the coevolutionary dynamics at play.
Next, Professor Jody Freeman’s paper on the contracting state offers a fascinating account of how environmental law is beginning to
outgrow the box administrative law has built around it. 5 As the coevolution between administrative law and environmental law progresses, we might say that the wiring between the two becomes
tighter and tighter. Environmental law has been a pipeline of cases
for administrative law to chew on;6 by the same token, however, environmental law has to live with what administrative law spits back.
Over time, that has amounted to process rules that channel how environmental law can shape itself. But now we find environmental law
experimenting with new forms of operating—such as, to use Professor Freeman’s examples, the Department of the Interior’s habitat
conservation plans and EPA’s Project XL—that seem more like con3. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV . 7
(2000).
4. For an excellent overview of this struggle between competing visions of environmental policy, see DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO- PRAGMATISM 35-69 (1999).
5. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV . 155 (2000).
6. In addition to Chevron, there are a number of classic examples. See, e.g., Bennett
v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 161 (1997) (discussing the so -called zone-of-interest standing under
the Administrative Procedure Act); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978) (invalidating so-called hybrid rulemaking); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 92-94 (1973), superceded by statute as recognized by
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 189 n.5 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the national security exemption under the Freedom of Information Act); In re Permanent Surface
Mining Reg. Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing the scope of an agency’s
authority under a general rulemaking grant); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 386-410
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing the ex parte contacts doctrine in rulemaking proceedings); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 589-90 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussing the reviewability of preliminary agency orders); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing the reviewability of an agency’s
failure to act).
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tracts than conventional regulation. Professor Freeman questions
whether administrative law as presently structured and theoretically
grounded is ready for this new spin environmental law has put on
the ball. Clearly this is a move by environmental law, and other
fields as well, that will require some deliberate and careful coevolutionary response from administrative law.
In the third paper, Professor Matthew Adler also covers topics important to this continuing coevolution.7 Environmental law theory is
brimming with welfare economics: Pigouvian taxes, Hardin’s Tragedy
of the Commons, the Coase theorem, and externalities are the bread
and butter of environmental law theory.8 More recently, however,
environmental law has begun to reconsider what “welfare” means,
how it is measured, and whether the conventional views really work
in the long run.9 Similarly, Professor Adler suggests a new theory of
regulation based on an updated vision of social welfare. He questions
whether neoclassical and proceduralist theories of regulation remain
vital, just as environmental law is reexamining its regulatory foundations. Perhaps this is evidence that administrative law and environmental law are so closely wired that their underlying theories are
also coevolving.
Finally, Professors Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer provide a
fascinating critique of the emerging positive political theory of administrative law and its emphasis on using Supreme Court cases as
the font of regulatory theory. 10 From the first year of law school we
are programmed to think that the Supreme Court is where it all
happens. But any seasoned environmental lawyer knows the significance of the D.C. Circuit to our field. 11 The D.C. Circuit—as well as,
to a lesser extent, the other U.S. Courts of Appeals—often is the end
of the line. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the Supreme
Court is irrelevant to our field. 12
7. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. R EV . 241 (2000).
8. Most leading environmental law casebooks include an exposition on these key ingredients of welfare economics. See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 70-95; FINDLEY
& FARBER, supra note 2, at 42-51; PLATER ET AL., supra note 2, at 97-124; JOHN-MARK
STENSVAAG, MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 55-108 (1999).
9. Recent editions of several environmental law casebooks have picked up on emerging themes in environmental law scholarship and research that challenge conventional
welfare economics, such as the notion of ecosystem services, “green” accounting proposals,
and research on biodiversity values. See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 47-58;
FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 2, at 51-62.
10. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage:
Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. S T. U. L. REV . 391 (2000).
11. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 6.
12. See Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial
Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV . 547 (1997); Does the Supreme Court Still Do
Environmental Law?, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 42 (introducing a series of commentaries on the question).
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As Professors Cohen and Spitzer suggest, perhaps it’s really the
Solicitor General who has made this so in both respects, not only for
environmental law but for regulatory fields in general, by acting as a
filter on the regulatory cases we get to “see” in the Supreme Court.
Their findings in this regard extend to explaining the clear bias on
the Court for the government when government does seek review.
They counsel that we take this “strategic petitioning” effect into account when using Supreme Court jurisprudence as a bellwether of
regulatory theory.
All in all, then, the papers speak to me in terms of the coevolution
of my world with theirs, of Type II lawyers with Type I lawyers. They
have taught me to pay more attention to regulatory theory when I
think about environmental law, and to tell my fellow Type II lawyers
to do so as well. With that, I gladly turn the proceedings back over to
the Type I lawyers and only hope I can keep up.

